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A realistic objective function for the atomistic central Bank and Treasury of a country 
adhering to a fixed exchange rate agreement like the EMS, would contain the public debt 
level, to be minimized for example to meet one of the requirements contained in the 
Maastricht Treaty, and foreign reserves, that cannot go beyond a lower limit if the country 
does not want to renege on the exchange rate commitment. Both the Treasury and the Central 
Bank will then aim to reduce the level of debt, attempting to leave the burden of the 
adjustment on the others, while at the same time caring about the foreign reserves level. We 
assume that each authority decides optimally the variable under its own control by taking into 
account the decision rule of the others (Feedback-Nash equilibrium), so that we obtain a 
subgame perfect, and therefore time consistent, solution.
Recent work on the subject has suggested the importance of independence of the Central Bank 
in order to increase the probability of success of a stabilization plan. Other contributions, 
however, argue that monetary independence may not be sufficient to induce fiscal discipline. 
In this paper we put forward a new argument leading to the conclusion that Central Bank 
independence might not be necessary to induce fiscal discipline: for this to be true it is enough 
that the fiscal authority assigns a high weight to the loss produced by foreign reserves 
variations. In the absence of "perverse" capital inflows, even with a dependent Central Bank, 
ready to inflate away part of the debt, the fiscal authority will act in a disciplined way to 
compensate the capital outflow produced by the monetary laxity.
Some keywords: Central Bank independence, public debt convergence, dynamic game, 
Feedback-Nash equilibrium.






















































































































































































A realistic objective function for the atomistic Central Bank and Treasury 
of a country adhering to a fixed exchange rate agreement like the EMS, would 
contain the public debt level, to be minimized for example to meet one of the 
requirements contained in the Maastricht Treaty or, in more general terms, to 
avoid any possible risk of financial crisis, and foreign reserves, that cannot go 
beyond a lower limit if the country does not want to renege on the exchange rate 
commitment. At the same time both the Central Bank and the Treasury will want 
to minimize the loss resulting from the deviations of their respective control 
variables from a given target” . Both the Treasury and the Central Bank will 
then aim to reduce the level of debt, attempting to leave the burden of the 
adjustment on the others, while at the same time caring about the foreign 
reserves level, given the adhesion to the exchange rate mechanism and the 
degree of financial and/or commercial openness of the economy. The simple 
closed economy conclusion that a budget deficit increases the level of the public 
debt while a monetary expansion reduces it, becomes complicated by recognising 
the implications that follow from the openness of an economy. The incentive to 
run a monetary expansion to reduce the level of outstanding public debt is 
therefore modified when the monetary authority is constrained by the level of 
foreign reserves. It is easy to understand that by charging the monetary authority 
with this additional objective, a tighter monetary policy might become the 
optimal outcome because a divergent monetary expansion that would reduce the 
public debt level, in presence of free capital movements would also cause a 
capital outflow and hence a reduction in reserves that increases the probability 
that the exchange rate will not be defended. The likely effect of a fiscal 
expansion on foreign reserves also has to be considered. The experience of 
the eighties in Europe suggests that the predictions of the simple Mundell- 
Fleming model might hold true: a domestic fiscal expansion in a fixed exchange 
rate system with free capital inflow leads to an increase in foreign reserves, due 
to the resulting higher domestic interest rates. If this is the case the negative 
effect on reserves of an expansionary monetary policy is compensated for by the *I
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effects of fiscal policy, so that the former could even be more expansionary than 
in the closed economy case. By considering different foreign responses to fiscal 
and monetary expansions in a strategic setting, however, it will be shown that 
even in the presence of a very accomodative, non-independent Central Bank, an 
exchange rate commitment directly involving the fiscal authority might be 
enough to bring about disciplined fiscal behaviour, the reason being that the 
foreign exchange reserves outflow caused by a divergent monetary policy will 
have to be compensated by a disciplined fiscal stance capable of attracting 
foreign capital. This is an apparently odd result, above all if interpreted in the 
light of the recent literature on Central Bank independence that suggests the need 
for an increasing degree of independence of the monetary authority in order to 
force the fiscal authority to follow a disciplined fiscal behaviour. As will become 
clearer in the rest of the paper, it is crucially dependent both on the assumption 
that no "perverse" capital outflow takes place i.e. that the market assigns the 
appropriate risk premia to the debt issued by a divergent fiscal authority and on 
the assumption that the latter itself assigns a high weight to the loss produced 
by a renegement of the exchange rate commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of the 
main conclusions reached in the existing literature on strategic games between 
a Central Bank and a Treasury; special emphasis is assigned to the Italian case. 
Section 3 considers a simple normal form static game providing the main result 
of the paper: when the Treasury assigns high preferences to exchange rate 
stability (i.e. prevents foreign exchange reserves from falling below a given 
threshold), the presence of an accomodative, expansionary Central Bank induces 
disciplined behaviour by the fiscal authority. Section 4 considers instead a 
similar open economy dynamic game also leading to the same conclusion. 
Section 5 contains the numerical simulation and 5.1 comments on the results 
obtained. Some final remarks are presented in section 6.
2. The strategic game between Central Bank and Treasury
Several authors have examined the strategic game between a monetary and 
a fiscal authority to minimize the public debt variability1. Tabellini (1986) 
analyses a closed economy dynamic game between a monetary and a fiscal 
authority (M and F respectively); each selecting the value of their own control 
variable, monetary creation (m) and fiscal deficit (f) to minimise their loss *
'Petit (1991) also considers a strategic game between a domestic Central Bank and a 
domestic Treasury using the econometric model in continuous time developped by Gandolfo 
and Padoan (1984). Unfortunately their results are of no help in the case that we are 




























































































functions subject to the common dynamic constraint represented by the growth 
of debt over time. The loss functions are composed of the squared deviation of 
their control variable from a given target and of the squared value of the public 
debt weighted by a parameter expressing the relative importance of the two 
components. He compares different solution concepts: Feedback-Nash, Cournot- 
Nash and Cooperative. In the first case each authority minimizes its own loss 
function by taking into account the reaction rule of the other authority. The 
optimal solution therefore is not only time consistent but also subgame perfect. 
In the Cournot-Nash case instead each authority precommits to a given (open 
loop) future behaviour and each player minimizes its loss function by taking as 
given the path of the current and future actions of the other. In the Cooperative 
case the two players jointly optimize a common objective function to which 
appropriate weights are assigned, reflecting the relative importance of the 
objectives of the two authorities2. The results obtained by Tabellini (1986), 
using the different solution concepts indicate that: the Cooperative solution 
implies the highest speed of adjustment and the lowest steady state public debt 
level while the Cournot-Nash solution produces a faster adjustment and a lower 
steady state public debt than the Feedback-Nash. The intuition is that in the 
Feedback-Nash equilibrium each authority takes into account the reaction of the 
other authority to a given debt level, and thereby reduces its own optimal 
adjustment effort. In the Cooperative case, on the other hand, each authority 
optimizes by considering the opponent’s objective partly as its own objective, so 
the individual optimal adjustment effort is reinforced. When increasing the 
degree of monetary independence in the Cournot-Nash case, the reaction of the 
monetary authority to a given public debt level is reduced while the fiscal 
authority’s reaction is increased, but in such a way that a lower speed of 
adjustment and a higher steady state debt level results. In the Feedback-Nash 
case, instead, a higher degree of monetary independence produces ambiguous 
steady state results depending on the parameter values while causing a slower 
speed of adjustment. This contribution, then, suggests that a likely result of 
increasing the degree of Central Bank monetary independence, is a higher steady 
state public debt level because the lower adjustment effort produced by the 
monetary institution (that refuses to monetize the public debt in order to prevent 
inflation), is less than compensated for by the higher effort imposed on the fiscal 
authority.
2 The Feedback-Nash solution seems to represent the institutional setting of a country like 
Italy in which neither the Treasury, nor the Central Bank seem to be able to precommit to a 
given course of action but rather reoptimize period after period. On the other hand, the 
Cournot-Nash case might depict the situation of a country like Germany, where the 
Bundesbank’s current and future actions can be considered as given, due to the institutional 




























































































Opposite conclusions are reached by Mourmuras and Su (1993) who, using 
a dynamic game version of the model proposed by Dornbusch (1991) show that 
a higher degree of monetary independence ("dominance" in their words) 
increases the probability of public debt stabilization. They conclude therefore in 
favour of the prescriptions contained in the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
independence of a European Central Bank. Not surprisingly, they also show that 
a high degree of polarization, i.e. a high marginal cost of fiscal adjustment, 
implies a higher segniorage and causes inflation. Their result, however, seems 
to rely heavily on the equation representing the dynamics of the probability of 
stabilization failure: only fiscal adjustment increases the probability of success, 
while no role is assigned to even partial and limited debt monetization or to 
output growth3.
Bruni and Monti (1992) also evaluate the possible disciplinary effect of 
Central Bank independence on the fiscal authority. Although there is little 
theoretical or empirical conclusive evidence of such an effect in the literature, 
Tabellini (1987) observes that the 1981 Italian monetary reform, the so called 
"divorce" between Banca d’ltalia and Treasury, was undertaken in the hope to 
bring about a more moderate fiscal policy and a less accomodative monetary 
policy. Fiscal policy, however, showed very limited signs of moderation, 
although the Central Bank had to act in a very restrictive way in order to 
establish a reputation for being "tough", given the initial uncertainty about its 
true nature. The inevitable result was a growing public debt.
A satisfactory explanation for the dramatic growth of public debt considers 
the role of what Bruni and Monti (1992) call "perverse" capital inflows, resulting 
from the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model. Such capital inflows make 
monetary management more difficult and imply the need to sterilize the effects 
of money created through the foreign channel, but above all assure the financing 
of the budget deficit, although at the price of higher interest rates. According to 
Bruni and Monti (1992), however, growing interest rates should still provide a 
decisive incentive for the Treasury to reduce the budget deficit, were the 
intertemporal discount rate not too high. If no such intertemporal constraint is 
felt, as they suggest is the case in many instances, the higher future taxes 
necessary to repay the existing debt are simply ignored.
Bruni and Giavazzi (1987), also stress the role of interest rates when 
considering the effect of a financial liberalization or repression on the budget 
deficit. Their point is that financial repression, i.e. the imposition of controls on 
capital outflows, allows the Treasury to lower the interest rate to be paid on the 
public debt so as to produce an expansionary fiscal bias. Only exposure to
3 The particular values assigned to the parameters of their model might also partly justify




























































































foreign competition when capital movements are liberalized, causes the Treasury 
to offer higher interest rates reflecting the higher risk premium to be paid on the 
domestic public debt. Capital liberalization, then, by causing an interest rate rise, 
should tighten the government budget constraint and therefore produce a fiscal 
adjustment. As explained above, in presence of a high intertemporal discount 
rate, the conclusion reached by Bruni and Giavazzi (1987) can be questioned. 
Moreover, further doubts have to be raised on the likely effects of a financial 
liberalization, given that it is uncertain whether the financial market will apply 
the appropriate risk premium on the public debt of heavily indebted countries. 
It is worth stressing that it is exactly this fear that motivated the imposition 
within the Maastricht Treaty of direct fiscal constraints on the public finances 
of those countries wishing to adhere to the European Monetary Union.
In this paper we argue that there is a different way through which 
financial liberalization may induce a disciplinary fiscal effect: a divergent 
domestic monetary expansion in a country adhering to a fixed exchange rate 
agreement causes a reserves loss if capital is allowed to flow freely across 
countries and in turn a constant reserves depletion would cause the collapse of 
the fixed exchange rate. It is easy to see, then, that it would be enough to make 
the Treasury concerned about the effect of its actions on the exchange rate or 
at least to increase the cost of reneging on the exchange rate commitment, to 
induce a disciplined behaviour on the fiscal authority even in presence of an 
accomodating Central Bank. One further condition, however, has to be added: 
that no "perverse" capital inflows, induced only by the higher fiscal deficits and 
interest rates should occur. When the financial markets assign confidence to 
virtuous countries with sound finances, it is easy to conclude that the incentive 
for disciplined behaviour is strongly felt. If markets, on the other hand, behave 
in such a way that a higher interest rate is enough to attract capital, ignoring the 
presence of any repudiation risk, and/or assigning more confidence to a highly 
indebted country for example just because its membership has been accepted by 
the sound countries participating to a monetary union, such an incentive is 
hardly present. The conclusion to draw, then, is that with free capital mobility, 
in which both fiscal expansion and monetary expansion cause capital outflows, 
increasing the weight that the Treasury assigns to the loss produced by the 
reduction in foreign reserves might be enough to induce a disciplinary effect on 
the fiscal authority. Alternatively, and more significantly, one can say that 
Central Bank dependence (i.e. Treasury dominance), will not induce budgetary 
laxity because of the fiscal authority’s serious commitment to man tain the fixed 
exchange rate agreement.
If this argument follows, the conclusion reached by Bruni and Monti 
(1992) that Central Bank independence is a necessary but not a sufficient 




























































































the presence of a non independent Central Bank devoted to debt reduction 
through monetization rather than to price stability, a disciplinary effect on the 
fiscal authority would result as a consequence of the exchange rate commitment 
and of the destabilizing consequences of a divergent monetary expansion. 
Central Bank independence would then be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for fiscal discipline. The prescription contained in the
Maastricht Treaty, that in order to move to phase Three no realignments should 
have taken place in the two preceding years, can be seen as an institutional way 
of increasing the weight that the Treasury assigns to foreign reserves and a 
disciplinary effect on the Treasury should therefore result.
Less clearcut conclusions, however, are reached when moving from a 
fixed exchange rate system to a monetary union. In the latter case the foreign 
constraint is no longer necessarily felt by a domestic country, so the incentive 
to run expansionary fiscal policies might arise in the presence of a dependent 
central bank, ready to monetize the budget deficit. If Central Bank independence 
were seen as sufficient to induce fiscal discipline, however, the public finance 
prescriptions contained in the Maastricht Treaty would not be necessary. The 
fact that both central bank independence and public finance rules (together with 
"no bail-out" clauses) are contained in the Maastricht Treaty, then, can only be 
interpreted as a sign of pessimism as to the likely effects of monetary autonomy: 
Central Bank independence, as suggested by Bruni and Monti (1992), is not seen 
in the Maastricht Treaty as sufficient to induce fiscal discipline.
3. A simple normal form static game
A very simple normal form static game between a monetary (M) and a 
fiscal (F) authority, both of whom have the option to expand (E) or to contract 
(C) their control variable, will help understand the main conclusions reached in 
this paper. Such an approach is by construction rather ad hoc (see also Giavazzi 
and Carraro (1992)) but it does provide well defined answers as to the equilibria 
reached when the relative importance attached to one or the other objective of 
the authorities’ loss function is unambiguously defined.
We assume that F’s loss function is composed of the deviations from a 
given target for fiscal deficit and of the variability in public debt. If preferences 
are assumed to be lexicographic, with priority given to the first objective (for 
example because of a high degree of polarization), then F’s pay-offs will be as 
shown in Table 1, where the best outcome is (E,E) with fiscal expansion and no 
debt, the second best is (C,E) with fiscal expansion and debt, the third preferred 
is (E,C), no fiscal expansion but money growth and the worst outcome is (C,C) 
with neither fiscal nor monetary expansion. In this and in the following tables, 




























































































for the monetary authority while the second number refers to the pay-off for the 
fiscal authority. Assuming that M is not independent from F, so that it is obliged 
to finance the budget deficit created by the fiscal authority and only at a second 
stage will it care about low inflation, its highest preference will be for a no debt 
situation and no monetary expansion, so (C,C) will be ranked first. The other 
possibility to avoid debt creation is (E,E) where the fiscal expansion obliges M 
to monetize the debt. (C,E) is the third preferred pay-off and (E,C) is the fourth. 
As a result, not surprisingly, the only Nash-equilibrium is given by (E,E) which 
might represent the Italian pre-"divorce" situation fairly well, in which the high 
rate of inflation produced by a dependent Central Bank allowed the government 
to avoid the debt growth.
When the Central Bank becomes more independent so that priority is 
assigned to low inflation and therefore low monetary growth (for example 
because of the adhesion to the EMS) which dominates the commitment to satisfy 
the needs of the Treasury (thanks to a monetary reform like the "divorce") the 
unique Nash-equilibrium becomes (C,E) (see Table 2) and it’s easy to conclude 
that a debt explosion will result. This is the situation observed in Italy during 
the eighties, when no incentive to reduce the budget deficit was felt by the 
Treasury, most possibly due to institutional and political reasons, to its high 
intertemporal discount rate and to the above mentioned "perverse" capital 
inflows. This situation is close to the one shown by Tabellini (1986).
When, on the other hand, in the presence of an independent Central Bank, 
external constraints are put on the fiscal authority, so that as a consequence 
priority has to be assigned to fiscal discipline (the public finance prescriptions 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty are one obvious cause of such a change in 
preferences), the Treasury pay-offs are different and, as shown in Table 3, the 
outcome (C,C) becomes the unique Nash-equilibrium. Although for different 
theoretical reasons this is the outcome obtained by Mourmours and Su (1993) 
and considered as possible when certain conditions occur by Bruni and Monti 
(1992) and Bruni and Giavazzi (1987).
If we now let the Central Bank preferences be as in Table 1, 
corresponding to a case of fiscal dominance (i.e. of monetary dependence with 
a very low weight assigned to reserves variability) but we still assume that F 
cares about foreign reserves (for example because of the high cost of 
abandoning the fixed exchange rate agreement) so that only after the variability 
in foreign reserves has been minimized does it care about public debt, the 
resulting outcome will also be (C,C), as in the case of monetary dominance (see 
table 4).
We can also consider a different situation, in which the monetary 
authority prefers high to low monetary growth (for example because by doing 




























































































reserves. If this is the case, the payoffs may be as indicated in table 5 and the 
first best for the monetary authority will be (E,C). In this situation, in which the 
Treasury’s preferences are assumed to be as in the previous case, the only 
resulting Nash equilibrium will be one in which the monetary authority follows 
an expansionary monetary policy, while the Treasury, in view of the exchange 
rate commitment follows a restrictive fiscal policy to compensate the effect on 
foreign reserves of the monetary laxity (see table 5). Although apparently odd, 
the situations described in tables 4 and 5 might represent the case of a 
government that uses the external constraint as a way to impose a credible, 
disciplined behaviour on itself. The Italian pre-EMS crisis situation, for example, 
can be interpreted as one in which the Government assigned a high weight to 
the loss caused by a reserves depletion or to the renegement of the exchange 
rate commitment. By doing so the restrictive monetary stance of the Banca 
d’ltalia was reinforced by a strong commitment to reduce the public debt level 
through a serious fiscal adjustment.
This issue we now explore in the context of a dynamic game.
F
C E
M C 1,4 3,2
E 4,3 2,1
Table T. monetary dependence and fiscal discipline
F
C E
M C 1,4 2,2
E 3,3 4,1






























































































M C 1,2 2,3
E 3,4 4,1
Table 3: monetary independence and fiscal discipline
F
C E
M C 1,1 3,2
E 4,3 2,4
Table 4: monetary dependence and fiscal discipline (with different 
Treasury preferences for foreign reserves variability)
F
C E
M C 3,1 4,2
E 1,3 2,4
Table 5: Monetary laxity and fiscal discipline
4. The Open Economy Dynamic Game Between a Fiscal and a 
Monetary Authority
Moving to a dynamic situation, M and F are now considered to minimize 
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The loss function of the monetary (fiscal) authority is composed 
respectively of the deviations in monetary growth (fiscal deficit), public debt and 
foreign reserves from their respective target, each weighted by a parameter 
expressing the relative importance of the different objectives4.
Debt growth over time (equation (3)), depends on the interest rate 
(assumed to be constant for simplicity), on the fiscal deficit and on the monetary 
growth optimally chosen by F and M.
The dynamics of the foreign exchange reserves (equation (4)), on the 
other hand, is determined by flow of capital and of the current account: fiscal 
expansion, by inducing a higher interest rate favours a capital inflow while 
monetary expansion, having an opposite effect on r causes a capital outflow. As 
we will see, different conclusions follow when a fiscal expansion causes capital 
outflows because of credibility problems. The current account is assumed to be 
determined by the domestic inflation rate that undermines the international 
competitiveness of the country: the higher the inflation rate, the higher the 
current account deficit produced by lower exports and higher imports.
The inflation rate (equation (5)) is assumed to result from internal causes 
(monetary growth and fiscal expansion) and external causes (reserves variation),




























































































with the latter depending on the degree of sterilization expressed by the 
parameter e5.
By substituting (5) into (4) our second dynamic constraint becomes:
(6)
( i+£x)
which we write as:
(7) R-r"R-b"m+xp"f
where the new coefficients have obvious interpretations.
As already mentioned the solution concept that we are going to consider 
is the Feedback-Nash (that approximates better the Italian situation), in which 
both authorities minimize their loss function by taking into account the 
opponent’s optimal reaction rule to the state of the system. Without loss of 
generality, the reaction function of the fiscal authority may be expressed as:
(8) /-e0+e1D+e^
where 0, and 02 capture F’s reaction to the debt level and to the reserves level 
respectively. The analogous equation'for M can be expressed as:
(9) m-y o+Y fi+ y
Using (8) and (9) both in the loss functions and in the state equations we 
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5 Monetary growth, fiscal deficit, public debt and foreign reserves can all be thought of





























































































( 12) k f - r f e - v
and the same relationship applies for the other shadow values. 
The first order conditions turn out to be:
v m , dH -A., -I
M nij M
+Ë L -Q 1]e<“
dD df
i.e.
(14) i f — T j P ' - t y + i  p - r - e j r f - (& % )/£
i.e.
(16)
< - [ ^ Æ 2]é-
^ dR df 2
i h - - k j .Rs-K)-(Q2w ^ ( p
(F r dHF dHF
- K - l dD dm 1Y i\e
i.e.
( 18) / t f - - T  f (D r Z5M p -r + y  j)/tf+(ô"y jX
i.e.
(20)
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(21) d H M M c „  M —  n-r— — A1 f h  +Tl lWW-1 1 ^ -0
(22)
I T
The usual transversality conditions apply.
5. The Computer Simulation
The model is solved numerically, given that no analytical solution is 
possible, due to the presence of the two dynamic constraints, by making use of 
SADDLEPOINT (Buiter and Austin, 1982) as modified by Mark Salmon to 
allow for Feedback-Nash solutions6.
In the simulations, D and R are treated as predetermined state variables, 
fa™, fi f ,  the Lagrange multipliers are treated_as non predetermined state 
variables, m and f are output variables and D, R, m, f are exogenous variables7.
Given the first order conditions seen above, then, the model can be 
represented in state space8 as follows, by considering separately the 6 dynamic 
state ((3) and (7)) and costate ((14), (16), (18) and (20)) equations and the 2 
output equations ((21) and (22)):
" See Miller and Salmon (1985) for a complete technical description of the solution 
method and Cesar and Della Posta (1990) for a practical guide to the modifications to be 
operated to the open loop model in order to get the Feedback-Nash solution.
7 See Buiter (1983) for the distinction between predetermined and non predetermined state 
variables, output variables and exogenous variables.
8 See Petit (1990) for an explanation of the state space representation of a system and Van 
der Ploeg and Markink (1989) for applications and use of the computer program PSREM that 
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r 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
- x m 0 ( P - r - 0 j ) - V '0 , 0 0
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-1 0 0 0 0 0
0 -1 0 0 0 0
0 0 -1 0 0 0
0 0 0 -1 0 0
0 0 0 0 -1 0
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0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
“ 7 o
b o -n* 0
0 0 0
As seen in equations (10) and (11), yl is the reaction coefficient of the 
monetary authority to debt variability; y2 is the reaction coefficient of the 
monetary authority to reserves variations; 0j is the reaction coefficient of the 
fiscal authority to debt variations and 02 is the reaction coefficient of the fiscal 
authority to reserves variations.
The results obtained in our simulations indicate substantial sensitivity to 
the parameter values. Given the value assigned to ô or to ip, expressing the 
reserves reaction induced respectively by monetary or fiscal policy, for example, 
well defined saddlepoint solutions are only obtained with particular parameter 
values reflecting the preferences for the monetary and/or the fiscal authority. In 
some cases no convergence is found in calculating the fixed point9. The stable 
saddlepath results obtained with suitably chosen parameters however, are 
perfectly in line with economic reasoning and shows that, when a fiscal 
expansion attracts capital and monetary expansion does not cause reserves 
depletion, a greater Central Bank dependence can provide the government with 
more flexibility. On the contrary, when a monetary expansion causes capital 
outflow and credibility effects are at work so that a fiscal consolidation attracts
9 See Markink and Van der Ploeg (1989) and Buiter (1983) for a systematic analysis and 




























































































foreign reserves, Central Bank dependence does not modify the adjustment effort 
undertaken by the fiscal authority.
Parameter values are chosen so as to simulate different economically 
relevant situations: the different capital mobility cases are considered by 
assigning different values to the 6 coefficient: 6=0.01 (from case 1 to 6) reflects 
a situation of almost no capital mobility; with 6=0.1 we consider a case of 
limited capital mobility (from case 7 to case 11) while with 6=0.2 we analyze 
a situation (from case 12 to 15) of higher capital mobility (20% of the domestic 
credit creation is assumed to be returned to the Central Bank in exchange for 
foreign reserves), tp is the coefficient expressing the effect of a fiscal expansion 
on reserves. We have considered rp=.l (cases from 1 to 11) to reflect a situation 
of "perverse" capital inflows following a fiscal expansion and tp=-0.1 (cases 
from 12 to 15) to simulate a situation in which efficient markets produce as a 
result the fact that a fiscal expansion causes a capital outflow rather than inflow. 
xM, the parameter expressing the weight that the monetary authority assigns to 
the loss caused by public debt variability, is assumed to take up values included 
between 0.1 and 0.5, reflecting different degrees of monetary independence (the 
lower this value the higher the degree of independence of the Central Bank). 
Different values of comparable size are considered for xF, 5m and 5f so as t0 
simulate different situations in which the monetary authority dominates or is 
dominated by the fiscal authority. The interest rate level r is assigned a 
"reasonable" 5% value, p is assumed to have value 0.06 to reflect a situation in 
which the intertemporal discount rate is only slightly higher than the interest 
rate. A value for p=1.06 is also considered so as to simulate instead a case in 
which the future is heavily discounted. The parameter expressing the weight r|M 
and r]F assigned to the loss produced when moving away from the target for the 
fiscal and monetary instrument is assumed to be higher than the cost caused by 
debt and reserves variations: monetary and fiscal authority have_a relevant 
target, determined by economic and social constraints (in=5% and f=5%). We 
can think of this and of the other values as GDP percentages. D is the public 
debt target that we have assumed to be 0.6 (the public debt/GDP ratio suggested 
in the Maastricht Treaty as the maximum ratio to be admitted to the monetary 
union). The target reserves level R is assumed to be 0.2 (again to be interpreted 
as foreign reserves/GDP=20%). The initial debt/GDp level, D0 is assumed to be 
1 (think about the italian situation in which the debt/GDP ratio is even higher 
than that), while the initial reserves level R,, is assumed to be the same as the 
target, so that the monetary and fiscal authority tries to stick as much as possible 
to the initial reserves level10. As for the remaining coefficients, their values
10 This is to stress the fact that reserves do represent a constraint imposed on the national




























































































have been chosen so as to represent a "reasonable" scenario (x=£=P=0.1, a=0.8,
r’> 0 ) .
5.1 The Simulation Results
The simulation results allow us to quantify the different conclusions 
obtained when assuming different institutional situations or market behaviours 
(see tables 1, 2 and 3 and the graphical representations that follow).
Simulation n° 1 can be taken as a basic reference with which to compare 
the other results. We assume almost no capital mobility (6=.01) so that a 
monetary expansion causes a reserves reduction only because of the current 
account worsening produced by the resulting loss of competitiveness due to the 
higher inflation (8” =.0833). The monetary authority is assumed to_be relatively 
independent and therefore public debt variations from the target (D=.6) are not 
highly weighted in its loss function (xM=.l); a higher weight is assigned to 
foreign reserves variations from a given threshold (R=.2) instead (£M=.3). The 
monetary authority is assumed to assign a high weight to its own monetary 
target (rjM=l). As for the fiscal authority it is assumed to be rather undisciplined 
and therefore it doesn’t care much about public debt and foreign debt variations 
(tf=.1£f=.1), while the primary deficit target has a comparatively higher weight 
(riF=l), reflecting a high degree of polarization. The reaction coefficient of the 
monetary authority with respect to public debt turns out to be Yj=. 1936, while 
with respect to foreign reserves y2=--0097. The reaction coefficients of the fiscal 
authority on the other hand turn out to be: 01=-.1873, 02=-.O132. A positive 
public debt implies a primary surplus to reduce it and positive foreign reserves 
induce the same behaviour on the fiscal authority. As a result, the optimal 
monetary policy at the origin will be .1406 falling to .0713 at time 10; the 
adjustment effort of the fiscal authority remains rather low (^=-.0334, 
fl0= .0349). In spite of a relatively high degree of monetary independence, public 
debt convergence (from 1 to .6391 at time 10) is obtained by a significant 
monetary accomodation. This result approximates the solution obtained in table 
2 contained in section 3U.
When increasing the weight that the fiscal authority assigns to public debt *1
the non-credible ones defined in the Basle-Nyborg agreement, established in 1987 to resiste 
speculative attacks on some weaker countries adhering to the EMS.
11 It should be considered that differently from the cases analyzed with the normal form 
static game in section 3, the results here obtained refer to a Feedback-Nash equilibrium, so 
that a relatively independent Central Bank takes into account that the fiscal authority’s low 
sensitivity to public debt variations and reacts accordingly in order to counterbalance the 




























































































deviations from a given target (in simulation n.2 tf=.3), the public debt reaction 
coefficient is dramatically increased and, as a result of the greater consideration 
by the fiscal authority (fo=-.1598), M can follow a more restrictive stance 
(m,j=.0952). This situation is close to the result of table 3 in section 3.
An opposite result is obtained when the monetary authority cares more 
about debt than the fiscal authority (simulation n.3). This result approximates the 
one obtained in table 1 of section 3.
Case 4 is comparable with case 1: by increasing the weight that the 
monetary authority assigns to reserves variability, the initial monetary stance 
gets tighter than case 1 (m,, moves from .1406 in case 1 to .0891 in case 4) but 
the adjustment effort undertaken by the fiscal authority increases dramatically 
(fo=--1572 in case 4 and fg=-.0334 in case 1): given the remaining parameter 
values, a very independent Central Bank forces the fiscal authority to stand a 
heavy adjustment effort.
When a limited capital outflow is introduced (8=.l) as a consequence of 
a monetary expansion, intuition suggests that monetary policy would become 
more restrictive to avoid a reserves reduction: in simulation 7 the same 
preferences as in case 2 are considered, but 8” =.1782. As expected monetary 
policy becomes tighter (m ^ .0576) and fiscal policy has to stand most of the 
adjustment effort (^,=-.1966).
Simulation 9 produces a relatively more expansionary monetary policy, 
due to the lower £M. As a result of the higher monetary expansion fiscal policy 
becomes relatively less restrictive with respect to case 7. In case 11, tm=.2 and 
the monetary policy becomes even more accomodative. Still, this is a situation 
in which, although the monetary authority is not completely independent, its 
monetary policy is not very expansionary (m0=.1207), while fiscal policy still 
remains rather contracted. This situation is close to the equilibrium described in 
table 4 of paragraph 3.
In case n. 8 tm=.2 but xF=.l, so that the debt reduction is mainly obtained 
through debt monetization and the fiscal authority does not make any adjustment 
effort.
In case 10 the monetary authority assigns a high weight to the loss caused 
by reserves variability, so it follows a rather restrictive monetary stance that 
obliges the fiscal authority to adjust dramatically.
Case 12, compared to 13 and 14 shows the main point of the paper, i.e. 
that when the fiscal authority is highly sensitive to reserves variations from their 
target a progressively higher degree of fiscal dominance (implied by a higher 
xM) doesn’t cause any significant relaxation of fiscal discipline because of the 
crucial assumption that virtuous fiscal behaviour attracts foreign capital thanks 
to the higher credibility gained by the fiscal authority (xp ” =-. 1089), (fj, moves 




























































































N 1 2 3 4 5 6
X M .1 .2 .1 .5
5m .3 .5 .3

















D 10 .6391 .6110 .6190 .6103 .6097 .6112
Rio .1403 .1385 .1410 .1386 .1385 .1418
n i o .1406 .0952 .2145 .0891 .0949 .2782
m io .0713 .0562 .0791 .0588 .0560 .0774
«0 -.0334 -.1598 -.0023 -.1572 -.1621 -.0496
f i o .0349 .0246 .0460 .0272 .0245 .0466
Yi .1936 .1032 .3564 .1059 .1034 .5227
Yz -.0097 -.0196 -.0075 -.0319 -.0230 -.0405
8 . -.1873 -.4710 -.1252 -.4686 -.4720 -.2395
02 -.0132 -.0201 -.0119 -.0299 -.0398 -.0549





























































































N 7 8 9 10 11
.1 .2 .1 .2
5m .3 .1 .5 .1

















D „ .6206 .6179 .6074 .6113 .6125
Rio .1198 .0675 .1010 .1324 .0919
mo .0576 .1860 .0743 .0455 .1207
mio .0046 .0419 .0270 .0100 .0303
fo -.1966 -.0324 -.1841 -.2154 -.1456
1̂0 -.0296 .0009 -.0043 -.0413 -.0009
.0734 .3344 .0881 .0613 .1978
h .3137 .1228 .1285 .4705 .1269
6 l -.4986 -.1481 -.4880 -.5155 -.4061
.2426 .1140 .1189 .3887 .1177





























































































1 N 12 13 14 15 16
T“



















D l0 .6029 .6012 .6000 .7265 .6537
Rio .1844 .1738 .1700 .1140 .0231
mo .0701 .1459 .2108 .0579 .1583
IU1() .0117 .0073 .0052 .0322 .0372
«0 -.1986 -.1615 -.1428 -.0668 -.0447
1̂0 -.0192 -.0230 -.0248 -.0098 .0026
Yi .1298 .3182 .4794 .0686 .3091
Y2 .4382 .4449 .4617 .0802 .0796
0 , -.4682 -.3781 -.3328 -.2277 -.1765
02 .4195 .4722 .5045 .0608 .0780
Table n.3: Different Central Bank and Treasury preferences for public debt and reserves































































































































































































































































































Convergence paths, case 5





























































































































































































Convergence paths, case 9
Convergence paths, case 10
-Public debt
-  Foreign reserves
-  Money growth




























































































Convergence paths, case 11
Time periods




























































































Convergence paths, case 13
-Public debt
-  Foreign reserves
-  Money growth
-  Fiscal deficit




























































































Convergence paths, case 15
-  Public debt
-  Foreign reserves
-  Money growth
-  Fiscal deficit
Convergence paths, case 16
-Public debt
-  Foreign reserves
-  Money growth




























































































the threat of attacking the currency and therefore depleting the foreign reserves, 
exercised by the financial markets induces fiscal discipline even in presence of 
a non independent central bank. This is the situation represented in table 5 of 
paragraph 3. To better appreciate this point this conclusion can be compared to 
the case with almost no capital mobility, in which a fiscal expansion attracts 
foreign capital. It is easy to see that in such a situation, contrary to that just 
observed for the no "perverse" capital mobiity case) when moving from case 5 
(t m= .1 ) to case 6 (t m= .5 )  the change of the fiscal authority’s reaction is dramatic 
(4=-.1621 in the former case while f0=-.0496 in the latter): when the monetary 
authority cares about public debt variability (i.e. it is willing to monetize the 
public debt), the fiscal authority reduces dramatically its adjustment effort.
A final interesting case is the one with a much higher intertemporal 
discount rate (p=1.06) (simulations n. 15 and n. 16). In this case both the 
monetary and the fiscal authority assign a much lower weight to future foreign 
reserves variations and public debt accumulation so that a less contractionary 
monetary policy and a less restrictive fiscal policy are obtained as a result of the 
optimization process. Only in the later stages will the two policymakers realize 
that the cumulated effects of such relatively more expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies have produced a higher reserves and debt variability, so as to 
induce relatively tighter behaviour. As a result of such low intertemporal 
responsability the public debt only gets reduced from the initial level of 1 to 
.7265 at period 10: a substantial public debt convergence is only obtained when 
the public sector correctly considers the future effects of the current actions.
6. Conclusions
We have considered in this paper how the burden of adjustment might be 
shared between a monetary and a fiscal authority for example when the adhesion 
to a fixed exchange rate regime implies the acceptance of public finance rules 
like those contained in the Maastricht Treaty aimed at the convergence of the 
public debt to GDP ratio to well defined targets. The debt to GDP ratio could 
be reduced either through a primary surplus, obtained by cutting expenditure or 
by raising taxes, or through monetization. Assuming that the Treasury and the 
Central Bank are two distinct decision bodies, as is the case in many European 
countries, it is possible to consider the existence of decision rules for each 
institution with respect to public debt and foreign reserves in which each 
authority optimizes the variable under its own control by considering the 
decision rule of the others (Feedback-Nash equilibrium). The optimal fiscal 
adjustment, the optimal monetary growth and their effect on public debt and 





























































































Recent work on the subject has suggested the importance of a high degree 
of independence of the Central Bank in order to increase the probability of 
success of a stabilization plan. Other contributions, however, stress that no 
empirical or theoretical result allows us to conclude that a higher degree of 
monetary independence is sufficient to induce fiscal discipline (the case of Italy, 
whose debt explosion has taken place after the 1981 monetary reform, is self- 
explanatory).
In this paper we have put forward a new argument leading to the 
conclusion that under certain conditions Central Bank independence is not 
necessary to induce fiscal discipline: if the fiscal authority assigns a high weight 
to the loss produced by foreign reserves variations and in the absence of 
"perverse" capital inflows even with a dependent Central Bank, ready to inflate 
away part of the debt, the fiscal authority will act in a disciplined way to 
compensate the capital outflow produced by the monetary laxity. The no­
realignment condition contained in the Maastricht Treaty might be interpreted 
precisely as an institutional way to increase the weight assigned by the Treasury 
to the loss produced by reserves variations.
The move from irrevocably fixed exchange rates to a monetary union 
where the monetary policy is run by a European Central Bank, might destroy the 
foreign channel through which fiscal discipline is induced. The need for the 
independence of the future European Central Bank, therefore, is not questioned 
given the existence of separate national fiscal authorities each of them having 
the option to run divergent policies in the absence of any direct foreign 
constraint.
It should be noted, however, that in the Maastricht Treaty even the 
presence of an independent European Central Bank is not seen as sufficient to 
induce a fiscal discipline on the national Treasuries. The imposition of explicit 
budget rules would not be necessary, otherwise. As a matter of fact, the 
availability of a larger European financial market together with the credibility 
offered by a strong European Central Bank, might provide the incentive for 
running expansionary fiscal policies, in the absence of direct and binding 
constraints like the one given by the foreign reserve dynamics. Future work 
should study the likely effects of a credible and strong European Central Bank 
on the incentives of national Treasuries to run divergent fiscal policies so as to 
find possible justifications for the imposition of binding fiscal rules on the 
countries adhering to a monetary union.
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